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ABSTRACT 
Several researchers have recently suggested that in order 
to avoid privacy problems, location-sharing services 
should provide finer-grained methods of location-sharing. 
This may however turn each “check-in” into a rather 
complex decision that puts an unnecessary burden on the 
user. We present two studies that explore ways to help 
users with such location-sharing decisions. Study 1 shows 
that users’ evaluation of their activity is a good predictor 
of the sharing action they choose. Study 2 develops 
several “privacy recommenders” that tailor the list of 
sharing actions to this activity evaluation. We find that 
these recommenders have a strong persuasive effect, and 
that users find short lists of recommended actions helpful. 
We also find, however, that users ultimately find it more 
satisfying if we do not ask them to evaluate the activity. 
Keywords 
Privacy, information disclosure, decision-making, 
personalization, recommender systems, user experience. 
INTRODUCTION 
Location-sharing services (LSS) enable users to share 
their location with their friends, and many have some 
additional benefit such as discounts  or recommendations. 
The adoption of “geosocial services” is however low 
(Zickuhr, 2012), and research suggest that users are 
plagued by privacy concerns that cause them to limit their 
location-sharing (Page, Kobsa, and Knijnenburg, 2012). 
Recent research has suggested that giving users fine-
grained control over their disclosure should reduce their 
privacy concerns (Consolvo, Smith, Matthews, LaMarca, 
Tabert, and Powledge, 2005). But this turns location-
sharing into a rather complex decision that puts extra 
burden on the user (Compañó and Lusoli, 2010).  
Arguably, then, we should help users in this decision 
(Knijnenburg and Kobsa, 2013). One way to do this is to 
frame the decision in a way that matches their evaluation 
of the activity. The question “What do you think about 
this activity?” is arguably easier to answer than the ques-
tion “How do you want to share this location?” Moreover, 
if this evaluation is strongly related to users’ sharing 
behavior, we can use it to recommend a (restricted set of) 
sharing action(s). 
This paper presents two studies that explore such privacy 
recommendations. The first study develops a set of rec-
ommenders that can infer the preferred sharing action 
from users’ evaluation of their activity. The second study 
tests the impact of these recommenders on users’ behavior 
and satisfaction. We present the results and implications 
of the two studies here; we refer the reader to our manu-
script for a complete account of the study procedures and 
an overview of related work (Knijnenburg and Jin, 2013). 
STUDY 1: POTENTIAL FOR ADAPTATION 
Our first study is an online user experiment to test the 
hypothesis that users’ evaluation of the activity is a good 
predictor of users’ sharing behavior. We recruited 100 
participants (44 females, median age group: 26-30) using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. We restricted participation to 
US workers with a high “worker reputation” and used a 
number of quality checks to assure careful participation. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to imagine using an LSS called 
“HotSpots”, which recommends locations to visit based 
on previously visited locations and also allows users to 
share their location on Facebook. We then showed 
participants 10 scenarios (see Knijnenburg and Jin, 2013) 
and asked them to choose one of the following 8 
disclosure actions (based on Duckham and Kulik, 2005; 
Li and Chen, 2010; Tang, Hong, and Siewiorek, 2012): 
A1. Fully use the system 
A2. Restrict Facebook posts to friends that are nearby 
A3. Restrict Facebook posts to certain friends only 
A4. Restrict Facebook posts to only share city 
A5. Restrict Facebook posts to only share city block 
A6. Use the system for recommendations only 
A7. Turn the system to “private mode” (anonymous) 
A8. Turn the system off 
Finally, participants chose one of the following 10 
evaluations of the activity (based on Kairam, Brzozowski, 
Huffaker, and Chi, 2012; Sleeper, Balebako, Das, 
McConahy, Wiese, and Cranor, 2013): 
E1. is exciting 
E2. is interesting for others 
E3. makes me proud 
E4. makes me look interesting 
E5. needed a good recommendation 
E6. is private 
E7. embarrasses me 
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E8. isn’t useful for everyone 
E9. doesn’t really represent me 
E10. may have unintended consequences when shared 
Results 
Table 1 shows that there is a strong relation between the 
disclosure action and the evaluation of the activity. Given 
the evaluation, it is thus possible to recommend an action 
to the user. For instance, if we recommend only the most-
selected action for each evaluation, we are recommending 
the “correct” sharing action to the user 43.2% of the time, 
which is considerably higher than the 12.5% we would 
get by recommending a random action. For practical use 
this is not very accurate, but if we recommend not one but 
a small set of actions, this set would contain the “correct” 
option more often than not. For example, if we 
recommend the dark gray cells in Table 1, we can get 
81.5% recall with 2.3 actions on average per evaluation. 
Increasing the number of recommended actions to just 
under 4 actions on average per evaluation (dark and light 
gray cells in Table 1), we can get 95.1% recall. 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
A1 34 88 14 25 24 0 0 1 1 1 
A2 6 25 1 6 6 3 0 32 0 4 
A3 5 16 6 9 6 17 3 41 1 8 
A4 1 8 1 11 6 4 2 10 0 2 
A5 0 3 4 1 1 2 1 1 1 5 
A6 2 5 0 1 23 112 17 58 16 36 
A7 0 0 1 0 0 80 18 20 19 40 
A8 0 0 0 0 0 34 14 27 4 26 
Table 1. The co-occurrence of actions and evaluations. Gray 
cells show possible action recommendations for each reason. 
STUDY 2: TESTING THE RECOMMENDERS 
Based on the results of study 1 we can create a system 
that first asks the user to evaluate the activity and then 
recommends a subset of the sharing actions that users are 
likely to choose. Two questions need to be answered 
when designing such a “privacy recommender”:  
How many actions should it recommend? Recommender 
systems researchers have found that list length is an 
important determinant of user satisfaction (Bollen, 
Knijnenburg, Willemsen, and Graus, 2010). In our case, a 
longer list of recommendations would be less restrictive 
and would have a higher accuracy, but may not help the 
user enough in terms of simplifying her decision. 
How should it present recommendations? The system 
could hide actions that are not recommended, thereby 
reducing visual clutter but also increasing the risk that the 
user cannot find her desired action. Alternatively, the 
system could highlight the recommended actions, keeping 
all options on the screen, but also increasing the 
complexity of the interface. 
In the second study we explored these parameters by 
testing five different privacy recommenders against two 
versions of the default system that just presents the full 
list of sharing actions. In terms of evaluating these 
recommenders, we focus on the following aspects: 
How accurate is the recommender? Using offline 
evaluations, previous work has shown relative success in 
predicting users’ binary (yes/no) sharing decisions (cf. 
Cranshaw, Mugan, and Sadeh, 2011; Toch, Cranshaw, 
Drielsma, Tsai, Kelley, Springfield, Cranor, Hong, and 
Sadeh, 2010). Our recommender has to predict among 8 
actions though, which is considerably harder. Moreover, 
offline accuracy evaluations do not always agree with 
online evaluations (McNee, Albert, Cosley, 
Gopalkrishnan, Lam, Rashid, Konstan, and Riedl, 2002). 
We thus purposefully evaluate the accuracy of our 
recommender in an online evaluation. 
Is the recommender persuasive? Merely calling an item a 
recommendation may increase the chances that users 
choose it (Cremonesi, Garzotto, and Turrin, 2012; Pathak, 
Garfinkel, Gopal, Venkatesan, and Yin, 2010). This 
would result in accuracy levels that are even higher than 
predicted based on study 1, especially when the 
recommender hides the other actions. 
Does the recommender increase satisfaction? Accurate 
recommenders are not always more satisfying to the user, 
and researchers have thus called for a more comprehen-
sive, subjective evaluation of recommender systems 
(Knijnenburg, Willemsen, Gantner, Soncu, and Newell, 
2012). Recommenders may give users a sense that they 
are helped (Häubl and Trifts, 2000), but they must leave 
users enough freedom to make their own decisions 
(Pariser, 2012). Moreover, inaccurate recommendations 
may be perceived as nefarious (Fitzsimons and Lehmann, 
2004), which in our case may manifest itself as privacy 
threat and reduced trust. We thus evaluate the recom-
mender with a comprehensive post-study questionnaire 
that measures users’ subjective evaluations. 
Procedure 
We recruited 368 participants using Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (166 females, median age group: 26-30). Each 
participant was assigned to one of 7 conditions and asked 
to use a mock-up of HotSpots to choose a sharing action 
for 10 scenarios (same as in study 1). They then answered 
a questionnaire to evaluate their subjective experience.  
Measurement 
The 22 questionnaire items were submitted to a confirm-
atory factor analysis to measure 5 factors: perceived deci-
sion freedom, perceived decision help from the system, 
perceived threat from the system, trust in the company, 
and satisfaction with the system (see Knijnenburg and Jin 
(2013) for measurement properties). 
Experimental conditions 
We developed 5 versions of the privacy recommender 
(see Figure 1), to be tested against 2 baseline conditions 
(resulting in a total of 7 between-subjects conditions): 
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C1. No recommendation: Regardless of the users’ 
evaluation, all sharing actions are displayed (this is 
the “comparable baseline” condition). 
C2. Long list, rest hidden: The dark gray and light gray 
actions from Table 1 are listed as “recommended op-
tions”; the rest is hidden under a “more options” link. 
C3. Short list, rest hidden: The dark gray actions from 
Table 1 are recommended; the rest is hidden. 
C4. One item, rest hidden: Only the most popular action 
for that evaluation is displayed, the rest is hidden. 
C5. Short list, highlighted: All actions are displayed, but 
the dark gray actions from Table 1 are highlighted. 
C6. One item, highlighted: All actions are displayed, but 
the most popular for that evaluation is highlighted. 
C7. No evaluation: Same as C1, but the user does not 
evaluate the activity (this is the “optimized baseline” 
condition, because no evaluation is needed if the 
system is not using it for recommendations). 
In every condition (except for C7), the system first asks 
the user to evaluate the activity using one of 7 options1. 
Each recommender then tailors the display of the 8 
sharing actions to the selected evaluation. 
Results 
Recommendation accuracy 
The first line in Table 2 shows the recall of each recom-
mender: the proportion of decisions that were in line with 
the recommended action. As expected, longer lists have a 
higher recall, but the short lists perform particularly well 
given the lower number of recommendations. Moreover, 
                                                          
1 We combined E2/E4, E6/E10, and E7/E9 because they 
were similar evaluations and also showed very similar 
behavior (see Table 1). 
the recommenders that hide items have a higher recall 
than the recommenders that highlight items. The “rest 
hidden” recommenders are thus more persuasive than the 
“highlighted” recommenders (more on persuasion below). 
This is likely due to the additional effort it takes in these 
systems to select an option that is not initially listed. 
User behavior 
Line 2 of Table 2 shows the recall when applied ex-post 
to the study 1 data. Ex-post recall is high “by design”, 
because the recommenders were derived from this data. In 
comparison, line 3 tests the robustness of the recommend-
ers by testing them on the “new” data of the C1 condition. 
The fact that the recall based on C1 data is lower than the 
ex-post recall indicates that we slightly over-fitted the 
recommenders to the behavior of the study 1 participants.  
Interestingly, though, the “actual” recall in the recom-
mender conditions (line 1) is higher than the ex-post 
recall (line 2): the mere fact that certain options were pre-
sented as “recommendations” increased their likelihood to 
be chosen. In other words, the system persuaded 
participants to choose one of the recommended actions. 
Subjective evaluations 
Participants’ behavior was influenced by the recommend-
ers, but what about their subjective evaluations? Figure 2 
compares the recommenders (C2–C6) against the two 
baseline conditions (C1 and C7) in terms of perceived 
decision freedom, perceived decision help, perceived 
threat, trust in the company, and system satisfaction. 
Temporarily ignoring the optimized baseline (C7), we 
observe the following: Although the recommenders result 
in somewhat lower (yet not significantly lower) perceived 
decision freedom, they do result in somewhat higher 
perceived decision help, especially the “short list, rest 
 
Figure 1. Mockups of the recommenders used to test conditions C2-C6. 
  C2: Long list, rest hidden 
C3: Short list, 
rest hidden 
C4: One item, 
rest hidden 
C5: Short list, 
highlighted 
C6: One item, 
highlighted 
1 Recall in study 2 98.7% 92.2% 75.0% 86.6% 62.5% 
2 Recall in study 1 (ex-post) 95.1% 81.5% 42.8% 81.5% 42.8% 
3 Recall based on C1, study 2 87.3% 67.3% 36.0% 67.3% 36.0% 
4 Odds ratio line 1 and 2 5.03, p < .001 2.80, p < .001 5.20, p < .001 1.46, p = .107 2.55, p < .001 
5 Odds ratio line 1 and 3 16.7, p < .001 7.51, p < .001 7.23, p < .001 3.93, p < .001 3.55, p < .001 
Table 2. Recall in the 5 recommender conditions (C2−C6). 
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hidden” recommender (C3), which is perceived as 
significantly more helpful than the baseline system 
without recommendations (C1; β = −.483, p = .025). The 
recommenders also result in slightly lower perceived 
threat, and C3 seems to instill some trust in the company 
(albeit not significantly: β = .305, p = .118). In terms of 
system satisfaction, the recommenders are on par with C1. 
Returning to the optimized baseline, Figure 2 shows that 
this system has a significantly higher decision freedom 
(β = .449, p = .040), higher decision help (β = .465, 
p = .021), lower threat (β = −.429, p = .038), and higher 
satisfaction (β = .455, p = .022) than baseline C1. The 
difference between C7 and the other conditions is that 
participants in C7 are not asked to evaluate the described 
activity before choosing a sharing action. This poses an 
interesting dilemma: Although a recommendation (i.e., 
C3) can increase the perceived decision help, asking for 
the evaluation that is necessary to give such a 
recommendation actually ruins the positive effect of the 
recommendation itself. Asking for an evaluation thus 
thwarts the positive effect of the recommender system. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper explored ways to help users of LSS to choose 
among a several sharing actions. Study 1 showed that 
users’ evaluation of their activity is a good predictor of 
their sharing behavior. Study 2 explored a number of 
“privacy recommenders” that tailor the list of sharing 
actions to the selected evaluation. Our results show that 
these recommendations are indeed accurate. In fact, we 
found that the recommenders were persuasive: users were 
disproportionally more likely to choose a recommended 
sharing action over an action that was not recommended. 
Companies can use this persuasive power to influence 
users’ behavior through recommendations (Cremonesi et 
al., 2012). Note, however, that recommending items that 
the user clearly does not like is likely to result in 
reactance (behavior that explicitly counters the 
recommended action) and lower satisfaction (Fitzsimons 
and Lehmann, 2004). This argument is in line with 
Wilson et al. (2013), who also warn that the subset of 
available sharing options has to be “carefully considered” 
because it “can influence users to share significantly more 
without a substantial difference in comfort”. 
In terms of subjective evaluations, the recommenders did 
not have a very large impact, although the recommender 
that presents a short list of recommendations and hides 
the rest (C3) is perceived as more helpful than a system 
that just presents all 8 sharing actions (C1). The fact that 
this recommender is both persuasive and regarded as 
helpful gives credence to the idea that recommendations 
are adaptive defaults: they facilitate the decision process 
by nudging users towards an option that meets their needs 
(Smith, Goldstein, and Johnson, 2013).  
Recent studies show that users’ sharing behavior can be 
influenced by subtle changes in the decision environment 
(Acquisti, John, and Loewenstein, 2012; John, Acquisti, 
and Loewenstein, 2011; Knijnenburg, Kobsa, and Jin, 
2013), and our current results corroborate these findings. 
Highlighting certain options makes them more likely to be 
chosen, and hiding the other options results in an even 
stronger persuasive effect. Taking this practice one step 
further, one could even remove certain sharing options 
altogether. Knijnenburg et al. (2013) show that in that 
case users’ choices among the remaining options will be 
subject to well-known decision context effects. 
The recommenders did not improve the usability of our 
LSS over the optimized baseline (C7). This reduces the 
practical applicability of our results, but it highlights that 
an adaptive privacy system, no matter how accurate, 
needs to be accepted by users as well (cf. Knijnenburg et 
al., 2012). In this specific case, the initial premise that 
evaluating the activity is easier than choosing a sharing 
action could be false. Alternatively, by asking users to 
evaluate the rather “risqué” scenarios, we may have inad-
vertently alerted them of the dangers of location-sharing. 
Luckily, day-to-day location sharing rarely involves such 
extreme scenarios, and this “inadvertent awareness effect” 
would thus arguably be smaller in reality. 
The fact that our recommenders did not increase user 
satisfaction presents two opportunities for future research. 
The first is to explore alternative ways to support location 
sharing that balance privacy and usability. Finding the 
optimal level of control is of key importance here: 
increased control can help to reduce users’ perceptions of 
privacy risk, but it can at the same time overwhelm the 
user (Compañó and Lusoli, 2010). Carefully designing the 
sharing options is a good initial step in this direction (cf. 
Knijnenburg et al., 2013). The other opportunity is to find 
a way to recommend sharing actions without explicitly 
asking the user to evaluate the activity. For example, it 
may be possible to “extract” the evaluation of the activity 
from a status update. Alternatively, users’ previous 
sharing actions at similar locations may be used (cf. 
Figure 6. The effect of the recommenders (C2–C6) on subjective measures. Because factor scores have no inherent scale, the 
measures are fixed to zero at C1, and scaled in sample standard deviations. The error bars are ±1 SE of the comparison with C1. 
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Cranshaw et al., 2011; Toch et al., 2010). Regardless, the 
findings presented in this paper show that the idea of 
recommending sharing actions to reduce the decision 
burden on the user is worthy of further exploration.   
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